We evaluated the epidemiological risk factors for MERS-CoV transmission during the recent South Korean outbreak. MERS-CoV transmission was determined by host infectivity and the number of contacts, whereas super-spreading events were determined by the number of contacts and hospital visits. Abstract Background: Transmission heterogeneity was observed during the 2015 South Korean outbreak of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) infection. Only 22 of 186 cases transmitted the infection, and 5 super-spreading events caused 150 transmissions.
INTRODUCTION
first-generation cases were defined as second-generation cases, and cases that were infected by second-generation cases were defined as third-generation cases [14] . Isolation was defined as separating symptomatic patients from others to prevent spreading, and quarantine was defined as separating or restricting the movement of healthy subjects who may have been exposed to the infection within the maximum incubation period. The transmission date was defined as the date of contact between the spreader and suspected secondary case during the spreader's infectious period. In cases with an exposure duration of >1 day, the transmission date was defined as the day with the highest likelihood of transmission, or as the median day during the exposure period in cases with consistent contact throughout the exposure. The date of sampling was the day on which the first positive respiratory specimen was collected. Close contacts were defined using the "Guidelines on Middle East Respiratory Syndrome" [15] , which include persons who stayed in a room or ward with a confirmed case, who directly contacted respiratory secretions from confirmed cases, or who stayed within 2 m from the confirmed cases without wearing appropriate personal protective equipment. Pre-isolation pneumonia diagnoses were based on radiographic evidence. Doctor-shopping was defined as visiting multiple healthcare facilities without an official inter-hospital transfer after developing MERS-CoV symptoms [16] .
Data collection
Epidemiological reports from the outbreak were evaluated to collect data regarding basic demographic characteristics, medical history, MERS-CoV exposure, symptoms and their onset date(s), sampling date(s), contact history, and post-exposure infection control. The reports were drafted during the outbreak based on direct interviews with the confirmed cases and follow-up epidemiological investigations that were performed to identify the exposure at Health Sciences Library, Stony Brook University on December 12, 2016 http://cid.oxfordjournals.org/ Downloaded from route and close contacts. Hospital information systems were reviewed to identify patients who stayed in the hospital during the exposure period and healthcare providers who contacted the patient(s). Persons who contacted confirmed cases outside healthcare facilities were also traced. Data from closed circuit television, credit card transactions, and health insurance services were also reviewed [5] . The numbers of close contacts were calculated based on the number of quarantines during the outbreak. All data were collected as part of the public health response and in accordance with the Infectious Disease Control and Prevention Act [17] .
Laboratory confirmation
Clinical specimens were collected in sterile containers and immediately transferred to 
Statistical analyses
Categorical variables were compared using the chi-square test and Fisher's exact test, and the Mann-Whitney test was used for continuous variables. The variables' associations with
RESULTS

Transmission chain
We identified 186 cases of confirmed MERS-CoV infection. Patient Zero infected 28 firstgeneration cases. Among the 28 first-generation cases, 8 cases were responsible for transmission to 121 second-generation cases. Among the 121 second-generation cases, 12 cases infected 30 third-generation cases. One patient with an unclear source of infection (Case #119) transmitted the infection to another patient. Four patients exhibited unclear sources of transmission (Cases #43, #178, #184, and #185). Each confirmed case transmitted the infection to 0-83 secondary cases ( Figure) . There were 164 non-spreaders and 22 spreaders (≥1 transmission). Of the spreaders, 5 cases transmitted the infection to ≥5 cases (super-spreading event).
The spreaders' epidemiological characteristics
After excluding the 5 cases with unclear infection sources, we identified 180 transmissions generated by 22 spreaders. One hundred and fifty transmission events (83.3%) were epidemiologically linked to the 5 super-spreading events. Twenty-five transmission events (13.9%) occurred within 3 days after symptom onset, 136 transmissions (75.6%) occurred 4-7 days after symptom onset, and 19 transmissions (10.6%) occurred >7 days after symptom onset. A total of 170 transmission events (94.4%) occurred on the day of or after a radiographically confirmed diagnosis of pneumonia. A total of 173 transmissions (96.1%) occurred before appropriate in-hospital isolation. Seven transmissions (3.9%) occurred between confirmed cases and healthcare personnel after in-hospital isolation: 4 cases (Cases #164, #169, #181, and #183) were doctors or nurses who managed confirmed cases, 1 case (Case #148) participated in cardiopulmonary resuscitation of a confirmed case, 1 case (Case #162) involved portable radiography for a confirmed case, and 1 case (Case #179) rode in an ambulance with a confirmed case during a hospital transfer. Table 1 shows the spreaders' and non-spreaders' epidemiological characteristics. These individuals exhibited similar values for age, sex, and presence of cough at symptom onset.
Comparing the spreaders and non-spreaders
However, spreaders exhibited significantly more frequent underlying respiratory disease We used logistic regression analyses to evaluate the risk factors for transmission ( Table 2 ). In the univariate analyses, transmission was associated with underlying respiratory disease, Ct chance of transmission by actively generating lower respiratory tract secretions and a productive cough. Second, it may be an indirect index of disease severity and hospital visiting status. In the present study, cases with pre-isolation pneumonia had lower Ct values and more frequent pre-isolation hospital visits.
The epidemiological significance of the high-risk period could also be observed when we compared the spreaders and non-spreaders. The spreaders were typically isolated after the high-risk period (median: 7 days after symptom onset and 4 days after a diagnosis of pneumonia), whereas non-spreaders were typically isolated before this period (median: 3 days after symptom onset and 1 day after a diagnosis of pneumonia). Similar results were observed in a study of the SARS outbreak, which revealed that late admission to healthcare facilities (especially >4 days after symptom onset) was associated with super-spreading events [21] . Thus, infection prevention measures should target isolation before this critical period (i.e., within 4-7 days after symptom onset and within 1 day after the detection of pneumonia). Interestingly, the average duration from symptom onset to isolation dropped to <4 days during the first week of June 2015, and reports of new cases have rapidly decreased since that time.
Among the host factors that were associated with transmission, only the Ct value was statistically significant in the multivariate analyses. The Ct value is a semi-quantitative continuous variable that is inversely proportional to the viral load. Ct values are associated with the severity of MERS-CoV infection [22], although its relationship with transmission has rarely been studied. In the present study, spreaders had significantly lower Ct values, compared to non-spreaders, which suggests that Ct values might reliably predict transmission.
Moreover, the cases with very low Ct values (Ct <23) tended to transmit the infection in uncommon circumstances. In both the present study and previous studies, MERS-CoV transmission usually occurred in the hospital setting [1, 11, 13, 23] . In contrast, cases with very low Ct values transmitted the infection in more diverse settings in the present outbreak (e.g., their household, in an ambulance, in an outpatient clinic, or to healthcare personnel after inhospital isolation). These findings suggest that cases with very low Ct values can potentially transmit the infection in unexpected conditions. However, our data regarding the Ct values have several limitations. First, various amounts of phosphate-buffered saline were added to dilute the respiratory specimens, and this may have affected the Ct values. Second, the Ct value is influenced by the specimen type and the interval between symptom onset and sample collection [22,24], but various different types of specimens were collected at different time points in the present study. However, we only evaluated 5 non-sputum specimens, and there was no linear correlation between the Ct values and the interval from onset to sampling.
Our comparison of the spreaders with ≥5 transmissions and spreaders with ≤4 transmissions revealed that the spreaders with ≥5 transmissions had an approximately 10-fold higher number of contacts. Furthermore, there were no significant differences in host infectivity.
These findings may suggest that the underlying likelihood of transmission has the greatest influence on super-spreading events, rather than an intrinsic difference in host infectivity. A similar finding was observed in a previous study of the SARS super-spreading event [4] , with those super-spreaders having 11-74 contacts, compared to 1-4 contacts for the spreaders with 1-2 transmissions.
The present study also revealed that a pre-isolation ER visit or doctor-shopping were associated with super-spreading events. In addition, super-spreading events were associated with the number of healthcare facilities that each patient visited for hospitalization or ER treatment, but not with the number of hospitals visited for outpatient treatment. In South Korea, patients who seek hospitalization without prior arrangements tend to visit the ER, and a history of ≥2 ER visits strongly suggests that the patient had doctor-shopping during hospitalization. Specific environmental conditions have been suggested to increase the likelihood of a super-spreading event [3] , and doctor-shopping may increase the likelihood of encountering these conditions. For example, when a confirmed case changes hospital during hospitalization without an official inter-hospital transfer, multiple environments are exposed to the infected case (an ambulance, an ER, and a ward). Thus, doctor-shopping can greatly increase the likelihood of encountering conditions that are suitable for a super-spreading event. In the present outbreak, 4 of the 5 super spreaders (Cases #1, #14, #16, and #76) transmitted the infection at ≥2 hospitals, as they had visited multiple healthcare facilities. Therefore, it is highly important to have an early suspicion of MERS-CoV infection and minimize doctor-shopping during the early stage of an outbreak.
The present study has several limitations. First, some of the confirmed cases had multiple potential sources of infection, and we attributed the transmission to the case with the highest epidemiological probability. The source of infection was clear in >95% of the transmissions, and we excluded 3 cases that had contact with multiple cases and an unclear source of transmission. However, as the analyses of the epidemiological data are on-going, the list of spreaders may change if new epidemiological evidence is uncovered. Second, we did not have access to genomic sequencing data, which might have provided information regarding There was no multicollinearity between the independent variables (all variables: R-score of <0.5). 
